

Current Indo-Pak Armed Conflict and the Role of Geneva Call

Dr. Muhammad Asif Safdar

Assistant Professor Law BZU Gilani Law College

Email: asif.safdar@bzu.edu.pk

Bilal Maqbool

Attorney at Law

Email: bilalattorneylaw@gmail.com

Abstract

Around the world, states are increasingly involved in violent confrontations by using means and methods of warfare which are in repugnance with the humanitarian rules both within their own territories and beyond national borders. The recent "Sindoor Operation" of India is the glaring example of it. This evolving landscape of warfare challenges the traditional classification of conflicts under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflicts. Despite these changes, the fundamental purpose of IHL remains unchanged that is to safeguard civilians and those no longer participating in hostilities, and to minimize unnecessary suffering during armed conflict. The applicability of IHL must be assessed through objective legal standards rather than left to the subjective judgement of the parties involved. This article seeks to highlight the role of Geneva Call regarding the Asymmetric nature of India military attack on Pakistan and assess how the Geneva Call can address and minimize the calamities posed by the Asymmetric Warfare (AW).

Keywords: Geneva Call, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Asymmetric Warfare (AW), Armed Conflict, Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs), Deed of Commitment, Humanitarian Engagement, Child Protection, Compliance Mechanisms, Humanitarian Norms, Conflict Resolution

Introduction

The history of Indo-Pak armed conflict dates back from decades and to quote the President Trump latest stance on its history as centuries old due to the ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic differences. But since 1947 the drastic changes occurred due to the strategic and geographical significance. This precarious situation resulted into Armed Conflicts sometimes international armed conflicts (IACs) and sometimes non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). But due to its hybrid and unconventional tactics sometimes it takes the shape of Asymmetric Armed Conflicts. This scenario

ensues the applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Keeping in view the multifarious human rights violations which are occurring during Indo-Pak armed conflicts, this article seeks to analyse the role of Geneva Call for the curtailment of such human rights violations in the region. The function of Geneva Call in applying humanitarian regulations during armed conflicts is vital for ensuring that Asymmetric Warfare (AW) follows International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In light of the difficulties presented by the state-centric framework of international law, Geneva Call utilizes innovative strategies like the Deed of Commitment to close the divide between international legal requirements and AW adherence. This study investigates Geneva Call's engagement tactics, including direct negotiations, third-party mediation, and voluntary commitments from AWs. The research also examines the organization's monitoring systems and its influence on child protection, health care accessibility, and the ban on anti-personnel mines. Despite significant achievements, challenges still exist in securing ongoing compliance. This paper evaluates the efficiency of Geneva Call's method and its roles in enhancing humanitarian standards in non-international armed conflicts.

The participation of armed conflict in the global sphere has been thoroughly investigated, particularly in the domains of international law and political science. Recently, the international community has acknowledged the importance of addressing the behavior of these groups, particularly in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Conversations regarding enhancing armed conflicts' compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) have become more frequent, as this legal structure encounters many obstacles. As highlighted by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the 2016 Istanbul World Humanitarian Summit, this period may be remembered for the extensive suffering experienced by civilians—deliberate assaults, the devastation of homes, schools, and hospitals, and the large-scale displacement of communities. Several elements affect armed conflicts' regard for IHL. A lack of understanding, an absence of motivations to adhere, and intentional violations of international responsibilities all lead to breaches. As Krieger pointed out, decisions regarding compliance emerge from intricate motivations shaped by power dynamics, historical and socio-political circumstances, and context-dependent elements. The composition of armed conflict's significantly influences their adherence; an organized faction with centralized leadership might impose rules differently than a disjointed, decentralized group. Moreover, an armed conflict involved in a peace initiative may interpret IHL distinctively compared to one concentrating on asserting dominance over civilians or showcasing military power. Similar to states in international armed conflicts (IACs), armed conflicts frequently evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of compliance based on their objectives and the present situation. Nonetheless, the state-centric framework of international law

presents challenges that may diminish armed conflicts' adherence to humanitarian principles. Three primary challenges occur: (i) international agreements mainly engage states, (ii) despite being obligated by IHL, Armed conflict are unable to formally negotiate or become signatories to these agreements, and (iii) states often overlook Armed conflicts' viewpoints on humanitarian principles, hindering their motivation to comply. Some armed conflict view international law as preferential toward states, which further diminishes their sense of responsibility toward these principles.

Given the characteristics of NIACs and the constraints of state-centered legal systems, specialized approaches have been created to enhance Armed conflicts' adherence to IHL. Certain non-state entities, including humanitarian organizations, have been instrumental in this initiative. The ICRC, as an exceptionally positioned international body, has been actively involved with Armed Conflict's to carry out its mandate for an extended period. Importantly, as early as 1871, founder Henry Dunant of the ICRC negotiated with the leaders of the Paris Commune to facilitate the release of hostages. Over the last twenty years, human rights organizations, which historically concentrated on state actors, have also started to document the violations by armed conflict and push for their compliance with international standards. These organizations employ a variety of methods—including dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, training, and capacity building—to effectuate changes in Armed Conflicts' conduct. Often, these strategies are blended according to the specific mandate and operational methods of each organization.

Geneva Call, a humanitarian NGO founded in 2000 by members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), functions within this framework, acknowledging Armed conflict as pivotal actors in confronting IHL-related issues. By 2018, Geneva Call had interacted with approximately 120 Armed Conflicts on a range of humanitarian concerns. This chapter describes Geneva Call's approach in fostering Armed conflicts' compliance with humanitarian norms. It explores the organization's methods of engagement, successes, and challenges, with an emphasis on child protection within NIACs.

Significance of the Study

Keeping in view the current grave breaches of IHL by the India ,this research article endeavors to minimize the Human rights violations by re-invigorating the role of Geneva Call. This article is very pivotal in the sense that it clarifies the importance of Geneva Call in encouraging adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) among Armed Conflicts, a vital component of alleviating civilian hardship in Asymmetric Warfare (AW). Considering that AWs frequently play pivotal roles in contemporary conflicts, comprehending how Geneva Call interacts with them via

mechanisms such as the Deed of Commitment is crucial for promoting humanitarian values. The research also underscores the difficulties and achievements of Geneva Call's efforts, providing important insights for policymakers, humanitarian entities, and legal academics regarding innovative methods to improve armed conflict accountability. By exploring the practical consequences of Geneva Call's activities, the research adds to the wider conversation on enhancing IHL adherence beyond state entities, ultimately supporting more effective humanitarian responses in conflict areas.

Research Methodology

This research adopts a qualitative methodology, leveraging a blend of both primary and secondary resources. Primary data consists of Geneva Call's official documents, field evaluations, and case studies of armed conflicts that have signed the Deed of Commitment. Secondary resources include scholarly articles, policy documents, and reports from international entities such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations. The study employs content analysis to investigate Geneva Call's engagement strategies, compliance frameworks, and obstacles. Moreover, comparative analysis is utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of Geneva Call's efforts across various conflict regions. The research seeks to deliver a thorough assessment of Geneva Call's contribution to advancing humanitarian standards and its success in encouraging armed conflicts' adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Geneva Call's Approach

Geneva Call, a humanitarian NGO based in Switzerland, plays an essential role in addressing the obligations of armed conflict within the context of international law, especially regarding International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Since the 1990s, NGOs have risen to prominence in influencing international legal standards, contributing to both hard and soft law through treaty negotiations, interpretation, and enforcement. As Bennoune remarks, NGOs have also taken on roles historically associated with states, such as delivering vital public services like healthcare and education. In situations of armed conflict, NGOs are actively involved in the conduct of warring parties, alleviating the deficiencies in the enforcement mechanisms of the international legal system. Geneva Call was formed after members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) realized that the worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines would not be effective unless Armed Conflicts also pledged to cease their use.

Given that the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines legally binds only states, Geneva Call created an innovative solution: the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for

Cooperation in Mine Action. This mechanism offers AWs a way to voluntarily commit to the fundamental principles of the treaty, thus addressing its limited personal scope. By allowing Armed conflicts to officially pledge adherence, the initiative promotes a sense of ownership and responsibility over the humanitarian commitments they assume. Geneva Call's wider mission is to improve compliance with IHL by obtaining Armed Conflicts' agreement and commitment to its principles.

While originally concentrating on prohibiting anti-personnel mines, Geneva Call has since broadened its efforts to tackle a variety of humanitarian issues, including child protection, the prohibition of sexual violence and gender discrimination, the preservation of cultural heritage, the prevention of forced displacement, and the assurance of healthcare access. Schneckener and Hofmann highlight that addressing particular humanitarian matters separately enhances engagement with armed groups, as it streamlines negotiations in comparison to complicated peace processes. This thematic strategy also aids Geneva Call's monitoring initiatives.

In addition to the Deed of Commitment, Geneva Call offers Armed Conflicts training on IHL and practical advice on its application. This is a crucial component of engagement, as armed conflict members typically lack formal education in IHL and possess only a basic understanding of its principles, such as civilian protection. Frequently, new recruits are deployed directly into combat with minimal comprehension of legal responsibilities. By instructing armed conflicts on IHL, Geneva Call seeks to enhance their compliance with humanitarian regulations, ultimately promoting increased respect for international law in situations of conflict.

How Geneva Call Initiates Engagement in Armed Conflicts?

Geneva Call connects with armed conflicts through three main approaches. The first approach is direct engagement, evidenced by its dealings with groups such as the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The second approach entails third-party mediation, where local NGOs, civil society organizations, or even other actors involved in AW help facilitate communication. This strategy was applied with the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal and the Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU)-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) in Burundi. Support from diaspora members, religious or community leaders, and other humanitarian agents has been essential as well. Finally, some actors involved in AW reach out to Geneva Call on their own after recognizing its work, as happened with the Chin National Front (CNF) in Burma/Myanmar.

Before starting a conversation with an Armed Conflicts, Geneva Call carefully examines the dynamics of the conflict and the internal

characteristics of the group. This involves evaluating its goals, leadership framework, operational setup, support networks, and its position on International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Following this assessment, Geneva Call formulates specific arguments to persuade the group to adhere to humanitarian standards. Former ICRC advisor Bangerter points out that a misunderstanding of an armed group's organization, cultural background, conflict dynamics, or the legal consequences of military actions can quickly damage credibility. Without this initial evaluation, Geneva Call would find it challenging to influence Armed Conflicts to comply with IHL. To effectively promote behavioral change, NGOs or other negotiators must exhibit expertise and a well-informed viewpoint on the relevant circumstances.

Geneva Call utilizes two essential criteria prior to engaging in dialogue with an Armed Conflict. The first criterion is the presence of an organized armed force that is either currently involved in military actions or possesses the capacity to do so. This requires a well-defined command structure, controlled access to arms, the ability to recruit and train combatants, and the operational capacity to carry out military tasks. A distinct organizational hierarchy is critical for ensuring that commitments made to Geneva Call are communicated as binding orders, with systems in place to prevent violations and enforce disciplinary actions when breaches happen. Furthermore, a stable command structure supports ongoing humanitarian discussions, while groups facing internal fragmentation or lacking organizational unity may be difficult to engage with.

Two additional points deserve attention. Firstly, although Geneva Call has traditionally worked mainly with politically motivated Armed Conflicts as opposed to those motivated by profit, contemporary conflicts frequently confuse these categories. Given that IHL is applicable to all participants in an armed conflict regardless of their motivations, Geneva Call is willing to engage with any Armed Conflicts that satisfies its criteria. However, its emphasis continues to be on politically driven organizations, especially those affecting civilian populations. Secondly, Geneva Call does not view the intensity of the conflict or the territorial control of an Armed conflict as key factors in assessing whether engagement is suitable.

Once initial contact is made through any of the previously mentioned methods, Geneva Call aims to promote an open humanitarian dialogue with the Armed Conflict. The goal is to comprehend the difficulties the group encounters in following humanitarian norms and to customize strategies that improve compliance with IHL. The method employed differs according to the group's situation. For instance, a group that is actively recruiting and utilizing child soldiers would necessitate a distinct intervention compared to one that lacks the necessary infrastructure to implement age verification mechanisms but does not intentionally breach child protection norms. Moreover, not every Armed conflict needs to be engaged on all humanitarian

issues. For example, a group that does not use anti-personnel mines might not perceive value in training regarding their prohibition. The extent and character of Geneva Call's engagement are thus determined based on its initial evaluation of the group's actions and requirements.

Geneva Call's Deeds of Commitment for Humanitarian Norms

Geneva Call has created four Deeds of Commitment to involve Armed Conflicts in upholding humanitarian standards. Alongside the original Deed prohibiting anti-personnel mines, the organization launched the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict in 2010, the Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination in 2012, and the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Health Care in Armed Conflict in 2018. Armed Conflicts can sign these Deeds if they fulfill certain requirements, which include having a distinct leadership structure, the ability to apply core provisions, and allowing Geneva Call to oversee adherence. These Deeds are executed by Armed Conflict leaders, co-signed by Geneva Call, and formally acknowledged by the Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva. The signing events frequently occur in the historic Alabama Room at Geneva's City Hall, emphasizing their importance. Armed Conflicts might opt to sign these Deeds to achieve political endorsement, declare their dedication to humanitarian standards, and enhance their international legitimacy. In certain instances, commitments made by Armed conflicts have swayed state actions, exemplified by Sudan's ratification of the Ottawa Convention after the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (SPLM/A) signing of the relevant Deed in 2001. Likewise, when South Sudan attained independence in 2011, its inaugural by humanitarian treaty was the Ottawa Convention, showcasing the enduring influence of Armed conflicts engagement in Geneva Call's programs.

The Deeds of Commitment correspond with international standards and impose both negative and positive responsibilities. For instance, the Deed for the Protection of Children forbids their involvement in hostilities and guarantees they are not recruited into military forces, defining children as individuals under 18. It also features provisions for delivering aid, healthcare, and education in regions overseen by Armed Conflicts. Similarly, the Deed for the Protection of Health Care requires Armed conflicts not to assault medical staff or facilities and to ensure access to healthcare services without bias. Geneva Call's method promotes peer influence among Armed Conflicts, as signatory factions encourage others to pledge to these Deeds. This has been evident in numerous conflicts, such as in Myanmar, India, and Somalia, where organizations motivated their peers

to embrace similar pledges. Geneva Call organizes meetings where armed factions address legal issues, execution plans, and humanitarian matters. A significant instance was a 2016 assembly in Geneva, where 21 armed groups from 11 nations gathered to enhance child protection and education in areas of conflict. Although the Deeds do not outline formal timelines for compliance, Geneva Call partners with Armed Conflicts through action plans to ensure enforcement via internal directives, training, and oversight, thereby bolstering adherence to humanitarian principles.

Geneva Call's Oversight and Monitoring Activities

Geneva Call's Deeds of Commitment contain a standard provision for monitoring, which requires signatory Armed Conflicts to permit and assist in monitoring and verification activities. This encompasses visits, inspections, and furnishing necessary information and reports to Geneva Call and other independent entities. Monitoring occurs at three distinct levels. Initially, Armed Conflict are mandated to submit reports that outline their implementation actions and obstacles, designating focal persons to enhance communication. Although no specific reporting procedure is outlined, groups have delivered updates through written correspondence, oral communication, and meetings. Next, Geneva Call assesses third-party information from various sources, including States, UN agencies, NGOs, local communities, and media. Lastly, Geneva Call undertakes its own field missions, whether as routine follow-ups or verification endeavors responding to serious breaches, as illustrated by the situation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Since signatory groups accept these visits upon signing the Deed, Geneva Call does not need additional consent for its missions. Over time, its monitoring capabilities have bolstered through a more enduring presence in nations such as Iraq, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Notably, Geneva Call's experience counters the prevalent notion that Armed conflict resist external oversight—almost all signatories have complied with monitoring obligations, submitted reports, and permitted follow-up missions even amid allegations of violations.

The Deeds also grant Geneva Call the authority to publicize cases of both compliance and non-compliance. This public disclosure can be advantageous for Armed Conflicts pursuing political legitimacy and acceptance within the international community by illustrating their dedication to humanitarian standards. For instance, in May 2018, Geneva Call reported the destruction of 2,500 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Western Sahara, fulfilling a promise made by the Polisario Front when it entered into the Deed prohibiting such weapons in 2005. Conversely, Geneva Call's monitoring also reveals infractions. A 2017 field visit to Syria discovered that the YPG/YPJ and the Democratic Self-Administration in

Rojava, signatories of the Deed for the Protection of Children since 2014, had participated in child recruitment. In reply, the group acknowledged its accountability and detailed corrective measures, including enhanced internal investigations and an official circular to all units reiterating their child protection policies. This openness in compliance and responsibility bolsters Geneva Call's credibility and reinforces humanitarian commitments among armed conflict.

How can Geneva call contribute in current Indo-Pak situation?

Since its establishment in 2000, Geneva Call has been instrumental in engaging with armed conflicts across the globe, especially in fostering compliance with humanitarian standards and safeguarding civilian populations from the horrific effects of warfare. Throughout the years, Geneva Call has collaborated with over 120 armed conflict participants, with 64 of these groups signing one or more Deeds of Commitment by 2019. This involvement has led to concrete results, such as the disarmament of child soldiers, the elimination of anti-personnel mines, and enhanced humanitarian collaboration in areas of conflict. The organization's initiatives have also made it possible to launch aid programs by specialized humanitarian groups, ensuring that those affected receive the necessary assistance. Geneva Call's involvement has resulted in numerous positive results. Numerous armed factions have made tangible efforts to fulfill their pledges, including ceasing the recruitment of child soldiers, stopping gender-based violence, and decreasing the deployment of landmines. In certain instances, their commitments have fostered wider humanitarian collaboration, even in the most difficult conflict scenarios. For example, in specific war-torn areas, Geneva Call has coordinated demining operations, enabling communities to reconstruct their lives without the ongoing danger of landmines. Moreover, Geneva Call's involvement has affected armed groups that have not officially signed Deeds of Commitment but have still embraced similar humanitarian principles. This illustrates the organization's wider influence that goes beyond formal agreements, swaying armed actors through advocacy, negotiation, and practical humanitarian efforts. Despite its achievements, Geneva Call encounters considerable obstacles. Some armed groups completely reject international humanitarian law, citing ideological, military, or strategic motivations. Furthermore, the fragmentation of armed groups, where a single entity divides into multiple factions that operate independently, makes it more difficult to ensure long-term adherence to commitments. Groups with decentralized structures, such as the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), occasionally find it challenging to uphold humanitarian standards consistently across their various units.

Another significant challenge is access to conflict zones. In specific areas, security issues, restrictions imposed by governments, and limitations on travel impede Geneva Call's capacity to interact directly with armed groups. Some nations have even made dialogue with armed groups they label as 'terrorist organizations' illegal, complicating humanitarian efforts even further. Nevertheless, there are instances where governments have collaborated with Geneva Call, acknowledging the significance of its efforts in fostering stability and decreasing harm to civilians. Geneva Call's experiences highlight a larger transformation in international law—one that recognizes the influence of non-State actors in shaping humanitarian outcomes. The conventional perspective that international law applies exclusively to State actors is increasingly being contested by the realities of contemporary warfare, where non-State armed groups frequently play vital roles. Through negotiations, dialogue, and agreements, Geneva Call has shown that it is not only feasible but crucial to engage these actors for the successful application of humanitarian norms. This shifting reality cannot be overlooked. The involvement of armed groups in humanitarian dialogues signifies an essential move toward alleviating civilian suffering, reducing war's effects, and promoting accountability in conflict zones. Geneva Call's strategy, which focuses on constructive engagement instead of isolation, provides a framework for future humanitarian efforts aimed at bridging the divide between international law and the complicated realities of armed conflict.

The significance of Geneva Call in addressing armed conflicts cannot be minimized. By collaborating directly with armed groups, the organization has played a role in protecting civilians, decreasing violations of humanitarian law, and establishing humanitarian commitments even in the most difficult conflict settings. While major challenges persist, Geneva Call's efforts have illustrated that engagement, dialogue, and constructive negotiations with armed groups can result in meaningful humanitarian results. As international law keeps evolving, Geneva Call's model of engagement will remain an essential instrument in tackling the humanitarian dilemmas presented by armed conflicts globally.

Conclusion

As the Indo-Pak has dilapidated militant history but in this regard, Geneva Call plays a crucial role in improving the compliance of Armed Conflicts with IHL through innovative approaches like the Deed of Commitment. By involving armed conflicts through direct discussions, third-party mediation, and awareness-raising initiatives, Geneva Call has made significant advancements in humanitarian compliance. The organization's influence is clear in its initiatives to prohibit anti-personnel mines, safeguard children in armed conflicts, and guarantee access to health care. However, challenges

such as fragmented command structures, inconsistent commitments, and political complexities remain. In spite of these obstacles, Geneva Call's engagement methods have shown that armed conflict can be persuaded to embrace and uphold humanitarian principles, thus enhancing civilian protection in conflict areas. Future initiatives should aim at strengthening monitoring mechanisms and broadening collaboration with other humanitarian organizations to improve compliance sustainability.

References

- Abi-Saab, Georges. "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols." *Recueil des Cours* 165, no. IV (1979): 353–445.
- Abresch, William. "A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya." *European Journal of International Law* 16 (2005): 741–767.
- Alberto Gonzales, "Memorandum for the President, Draft, January 25, 2002," in *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib*, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 118–19.
- Aldrich, George. "Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions." *American Journal of International Law* 85 (1991): 1–20.
- Allan Rosas and Theodor Meron, "Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards," *American Journal of International Law* 89 (1995): 215–18.
- Andreas L. Paulus. "Peace through Justice? The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time of Crisis." *Wayne Law Review* 50, no. 1 (2004): 1–34.
- Antonio Cassese, *International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 420–23.
- Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, eds. *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Arnold, Roberta, and Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand, eds. *International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century's Conflicts: Changes and Challenges*. Lausanne/Berne/Lugano: Edis, 2005.
- APCLS. *Règles de la Guerre dans le Mouvement Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo libre et souverain*. 2015. http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/apcls_regle_de_la_guerre_2015-de43f439e7bb54263caec76dcbf0a2bd.pdf. Accessed December 3, 2018.
- Art. 8(2)(f), *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf>.
- Angus Stevenson and Catherine Soanes, eds., *Oxford Dictionary of English* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1416.

- Bangerter, Olivier. "The ICRC and Non-State Armed Groups." In *Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law*, edited by Geneva Call, PSIO, and UNIDIR, 74–85. 2008. <http://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/conference-report-eng-0-107.pdf>. Accessed August 13, 2019.
- Bangerter O (2011) Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not. *International Review of the Red Cross* 93(882):353–384.
- Bangerter, Olivier. "Comment – Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Humanitarian Law." In *Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region*, edited by Heike Krieger, 112–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Bellal, Annyssa. *The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017*. Geneva: Geneva Academy, 2018. <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20War%20Report%20Armed%20Conflicts%20in%2020%2017.pdf>. Accessed August 20, 2018.
- Bennoune, Karen. "Productive Tensions: Women's Rights NGOs, the 'Mainstream' Human Rights Movement, and International Lawmaking." In *Non-State Actors, Soft Law Protective Regimes: From the Margins*, edited by Cecile Bailliet, 125–50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Blakke, Kjell, et al. "The Problem with Fragmented Insurgencies." *The Washington Post*, May 13, 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/13/the-problem-with-fragmented-insurgencies/>. Accessed August 13, 2019.
- Bongard, Philippe. "Le Rôle des Organisations Non Gouvernementales dans L'Incitation des Groupes Armés Au Respect du Droit International Humanitaire: L'Expérience de l'Appel de Genève." In *Les Tiers aux Conflits Armés et la Protection des Populations Civiles*, edited by Jean-Marc Sorel and Isabelle Fouchard, 153–72. Paris: Pedone, 2010.
- Bongard, Philippe. "Engaging Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Norms: Reflections on Geneva Call's Experience." *HPN–Humanitarian Practice Network*. <https://odihpn.org/publication/engaging-armed-non-state-actors-on-humanitarian-norms-reflections-on-geneva-call%C2%92s-experience/>. Accessed December 3, 2018.
- Bongard P, Somer J (2011) Monitoring armed non-state actor compliance with humanitarian norms: a look at international mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. *International Review of the Red Cross* 93(883):673–706.
- Breton-Le Goff G (2011) NGOs' perspectives on non-state actors. In: d'Aspremont (ed) *Participants in the International Legal System*. Multiple

- perspectives on non-state actors in international law. Routledge, London/New York, pp 248–266.
- Corn, Geoffrey S. “Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict.” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 40, no. 2 (2007): 295–355.
- Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?” *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 864 (2006): 881–904.
- Feldman, Yotam, and Uri Blau. “Consent and Advise.” *Haaretz*, January 29, 2009. <https://www.haaretz.com/2009-01-29/ty-article/consent-and-advise/0000017f-e1a6-d9aa-afff-f9fe5e100000>.
- Fleck, Dieter, ed. *The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Greenwood, Christopher. “The Concept of War in Modern International Law.” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 36 (1987): 283–306.
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?* Opinion Paper. March 2008. [https://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-article-170308/\\$file/Opinionpaper-armed-conflict.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-article-170308/$file/Opinionpaper-armed-conflict.pdf).
- International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force. *Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law*. 2008. <https://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1022>.
- Lauterpacht, Elihu. “The Legal Irrelevance of the ‘State of War.’” *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* 62 (1968): 58.
- Münkler, Herfried. “The Wars of the 21st Century.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 85, no. 849 (2003): 7–22.
- Münkler, Herfried. *Der Wandel des Krieges: Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie*. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2006.
- O’Connell, Mary Ellen. “Defining Armed Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 13 (2009): 393–400.
- Pfanner, Toni. “Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 857 (2005): 149–74.
- Schmitt, Michael N. “Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law.” *Air Force Law Review* 62 (2008): 1–42.
- Schmitt, Michael N. “21st Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?” *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 8, no. 2 (2007): 443–76.
- Watkin, Kenneth. “21st Century Conflicts and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo or Change?” In *International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines*, edited by Michael N. Schmitt and Jelena Pejić, 265–96. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill BV, 2007.